Crisis Driven Innovation: the case of humanitarian innovation by Bessant, John et al.
 
 
 
1 
 
 
Crisis-driven innovation: The case of humanitarian innovation 
 
 
John Bessant1, Howard Rush2, Anna Trifilova3 
 
1University of Exeter, United Kingdom 
 
2University of Brighton, CENTRIM, United Kingdom. 
3University of Saint Petersburg, Universitetskay Nabereshnaya, 
7/9, Saint Petersburg, 199034, Russia 
 
 
 
Abstract: Innovation is often presented as a survival issue and this 
provides a powerful metaphor to focus attention on the need to 
manage it effectively.  But in the humanitarian context it takes on a 
very literal meaning. Crises, whether natural or man-made, require 
rapid problem solving if agencies and aid workers are to avoid the 
huge negative impacts of such disasters.  
That makes consideration of how innovation takes place in this sector 
an urgent challenge. How can the humanitarian sector best organize 
to enable innovation and what are the roles for key actors – donors, 
agencies, and most importantly ‘users’? Our paper summarizes the 
nature of the challenge and reviews experience so far in humanitarian 
innovation (HI). 
There is a second issue which we also explore. Arguably crisis 
conditions provide a ‘laboratory’ for exploring alternative approaches 
and generating novel innovation trajectories which might diffuse more 
widely – the concept of ‘reverse innovation’. Are there lessons which 
could be learned for mainstream innovation management? And if so, 
what are the mechanisms which might enable such learning and 
experience exchange to take place? 
Keywords: humanitarian innovation; crisis-driven innovation; reverse 
innovation. 
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1.  Humanitarian innovation 
Innovation is often presented as a survival issue and this provides a 
powerful metaphor to focus attention on the need to manage innovation 
and to update our capabilities to do so on a continuing basis.  But in the 
humanitarian context it takes on a very literal meaning.  Crises, whether 
natural or man-made, require rapid problem solving if agencies and aid 
workers are to avoid the huge negative impacts of such disasters; 
innovation in this context is often a life-or-death issue. 
 
The importance of humanitarian innovation (HI) should not be 
underestimated. As a recent United Nations report put it: ‘…. nearly 150 
million people were affected by a combination of natural disasters, wars 
and conflicts in 2013, and the number of people needing assistance as a 
result has more than doubled over the last decade. International 
humanitarian agencies are already struggling to meet these growing and 
increasingly complex needs.  Without concerted effort, the gap between 
what is needed and what is provided is likely to grow in the coming years 
and decades.’1   
 
Whilst HI has always taken place little formal attention was paid to how it 
was organized and managed until recently.  Problem-solving under crisis 
conditions and ad hoc responses characterized the sector as distinct from 
a more planned and prepared approach which sought to learn from prior 
experience and develop more effective models.  One indicator of this was 
that in the literature related to the humanitarian sector there were no 
publications focused on the subject until 2009 (Bessant, Rush et al. 2014).  
 
                                                 
1 UN OCHA (2015). World Humanitarian Data and Trends 2014, New York.  
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A key study was published in that year by ALNAP1 which attempted a 
definition and offered a suggested framework for HI, drawing on a series 
of case studies as illustrations and building on relevant literature 
(Ramalingam, Scriven et al. 2010). That study closed with a framework for 
humanitarian innovation showed that innovation forms and processes 
were embedded in three supporting areas:  
 
• Capacities, including those of innovation entrepreneurs and 
leaders; field and operational staff; researchers and 
evaluators, and external experts;  
• Relationships, including with affected populations, within aid 
agencies, between international and national actors, with 
researchers and academics, with the private sector, and 
between operational agencies;  
• Contextual factors relating to the sector, including culture of 
risk, financing, codes and standards and incentives. 
 
The study also showed that the turning point in innovation management 
involved not just a series of windows of opportunity for a new idea or 
practice, but also serious constraints on the existing standard operating 
procedures, so that there was little choice but for a new approach to be 
attempted.  ALNAP’s work was used to support the founding of the 
Humanitarian Innovation Fund (HIF), an agency with the remit to provide 
both a funding route for entrepreneurial ideas in the HI space and also to 
raise awareness and build capacity in the field.   
 
Since the publication of the ALNAP report there has been a growing 
interest in the HI theme and an increase in publications – for example, 
the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review of the UK Government’s 
aid efforts (DFID 2011). HI research involves multiple themes – for 
example, the University of Oxford’s Humanitarian Innovation Project 
(OxHIP) highlights the need for more bottom-up, user driven innovation 
especially amongst refugee groups (Betts and Bloom 2014).  Medecins 
sans Frontieres (MSF) took a sectoral perspective in their review of 
medical innovations (Bradol and Vidal 2011). In 2012 the HIF 
                                                 
1 The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Action was established in 1997 as a mechanism to provide a forum on learning, 
accountability and performance issues for the humanitarian sector. See www.alnap.org 
for more information. 
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commissioned a review of the gaps in emergency water and sanitation 
that would be the focus of targeted innovation management processes 
and The Shelter Centre has convened similar research in emergency 
shelter. 
 
Over the past six years there has been steady acceleration in interest and 
a shift in attention to the humanitarian innovation system as a whole.  
The issue is now high on the agenda – for example the 2016 United 
Nations World Humanitarian Summit will spend much of its time focusing 
on the innovation question.  In particular attention is moving from 
recognizing the importance of sustained innovation to thinking about 
how best might we organize and manage it? 
 
Overall, innovation practices appear to be slowly evolving: for example, 
the growing use of design-led approaches in public, social and 
development innovation is now diffusing into the humanitarian sector. 
User-led innovation is another key theme, for example with front-line 
workers and sometimes aid recipients themselves being involved in 
innovation processes 1.  
2. Research design and methodology 
 
This paper reports on progress so far in a project funded by the UK’s 
Department for International Development (Ramalingam, Rush et al. 
2015). It draws upon a literature review (Bessant, Rush et al. 2014), an 
extensive (and continuing) series of interviews with over 50 key 
stakeholders in the humanitarian innovation (HI) system and on a series 
of detailed case studies in five key sectors dealing with food, water and 
sanitation, healthcare, shelter and the underlying financing of HI.  
In this work we are using a framework for analysis exploring key 
resources, roles, relationships and routines, and a systems map as a 
means by which the different elements and interactions (invention, 
development and adoption of innovations) of the HI ecosystem can be 
better understood (Lundvall 1990; Nelson 1993; OECD 1997). 
                                                 1 An example is the UK AMPLIFY project, conducted with support from IDEO. See 
https://www.gov.uk/international-development-funding/amplify-collaborative-challenge-
fund for more. 
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Research has been based on secondary sources and interviews with key 
players in the field, using a snowball approach in which respondents are 
asked to nominate others who could contribute useful perspectives. 
Building upon the interview survey referred to above, the case studies 
included over 200 in-depth interviews with technical experts, service 
providers, managers, researchers, etc., in each of the respective 
humanitarian sub-sectors covered in the case studies. 
 
Our research questions in this project can be summarised as: 
• What is the current ‘state of the art’ regarding humanitarian 
innovation? 
• What lessons might usefully be transferred from wider innovation 
management experience? 
• What lessons might the HI system contribute to that wider 
experience? 
 
We will explore our early findings in respect of these questions in the 
following sections. 
3. Patterns in humanitarian innovation – the current ‘state-of-the-art’1 
Although not formally studied until recently HI operates in ways which 
can be mapped to existing models of innovation management.  There is a 
‘market’ whose needs are articulated by a variety of agencies and actors, 
and innovations are developed to try and meet those needs.  There is a 
much less well-developed ‘R&D’ system which generates solutions in 
proactive fashion, and then tests and improves them in the field; funding 
for this aspect of HI is limited and concentrated mainly in the hands of 
donors who tend to be risk-averse (in part because they are acting as 
stewards for public and donated monies).  The resulting innovation 
                                                 1 A more detailed discussion of the HI innovation ecosystem can be found Rush, H., J. Bessant, B. Ramalingam, I. Gray, W. Gray, K. Hoffman and N. Marshall (2015). Strengthening the humanitarian innovation system. Brighton, CENTRIM, University of Brighton. 
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system tends to follow clearly established aid trajectories within which 
incremental ‘sustaining’ innovations take place rather in the fashion of 
large companies in mature markets.  At the same time there is 
considerable experimentation at the edges of this system, often involving 
entrepreneurs working in close collaboration with end users and evolving 
novel solutions to HI crises.  Activity here approximates to the early stage 
learning and experimentation at the fringe which characterises emergent 
disruptive innovation in Christensen’s analysis (Christensen 1997).   But 
for many interesting innovations which emerge here there is the major 
problem of moving to scale, of developing and testing solutions which are 
robust enough to be widely deployed and which do not challenge existing 
delivery agencies (McClure and Gray 2015).  
The result is a tension between two parallel and potentially 
complementary innovation models – one concerned with incremental 
improvements along a dominant design trajectory and the other offering 
radical solutions but often lacking the traction to move to the 
mainstream. 
These are, of course, familiar patterns in the wide innovation literature.  
They echo the extensive discussion of ‘ambidexterity’ within large 
organizations, the need for internal venturing and corporate 
entrepreneurship and the challenges posed by turbulent uncertain 
environments with attendant risks of disruption (Kuratko, Hornsby et al. ; 
Tushman and O'Reilly 1996; Augsdorfer, Bessant et al. 2013; Martini, 
Neiretti et al. 2015).    It will be useful to explore a particular case in a 
little more detail since it highlights these two parallel innovation strands. 
 4. A case example – cash-based programming in food assistance 
Early days 
Although there are many early examples of food aid the origins of a 
systematic and large-scale response can probably be dated back to the 
1950s.  A combination of accumulated surpluses in developed countries 
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like the US and the EEC and the desperate plight of many in famine-
afflicted areas led to the development of food aid programmes.  In 1963 
the World Food Programme (WFP) was formed as a UN agency with the 
mission of eradicating hunger and malnutrition.  
 
A supply and distribution ecosystem emerged with major agencies like 
WFP linking donors of money and food with large non-governmental 
organization (NGO) delivery partners (like World Vision, CARE and Oxfam) 
handling distribution. By the 1970s the systems for delivering such aid 
were well-developed and there was extensive innovation supporting the 
core mechanisms in place. Process innovation focused on improving 
warehousing and consolidation, on transport and logistics and on 
distribution management. Product innovation included work on 
improving nutritional value and ‘position innovation’ (Francis and Bessant 
2005) was concerned with extending the range of targets towards which 
aid could be delivered and learning and adapting systems for those 
contexts.    
The 1980s – gradually changing the pattern 
The 1980s saw a gradual shift in approach, in part triggered by the 
decline in agricultural surpluses in the developed countries and in part by 
recognition that local markets could often be a viable source of supply 
(Barrett and Maxwell 2005). There was also growing concern that large 
food aid deliveries had a depressing effect on local markets. Emphasis 
shifted towards procurement rather than delivery and this period saw a 
move towards internal or regional purchases to stimulate markets. 
Agencies like WFP began to receive an increasing proportion of donations 
in the form of money rather than kind and this shift created a need for 
new capabilities and infrastructure – for example in monitoring prices 
and suppliers on the international market and brokering aid delivery.  
 
In parallel a small number of experiments with a radical alternative were 
taking place using cash directly to enable the purchase of food on local 
markets. These emerged for many reasons – sometimes (as in the Eritrea 
crisis) it became dangerous to ship food because convoys were attacked. 
Instead mechanisms evolved to allow surreptitious movement of money 
to crisis zones to enable some form of food assistance to be provided. 
There was also growing recognition that even if food was provided as aid 
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recipients would sometimes trade this on local markets for things which 
they needed more – in essence food was being used as a currency with 
which to procure other supplies of goods or services.  
 
The idea behind this was not new – for example, Clara Barton, one of the 
founding figures of the American Red Cross, helped to organize cash 
relief following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 and similar 
programmes were organized in response to the Galveston floods in Texas 
in 1900 (Harvey 2007).  In 1948 the British administration’s response to 
the famine in Sudan was to distribute cash, coffee and train tickets and in 
India they responded to famines by providing waged labour (Keen 1992). 
Cash relief interventions were also implemented in famines in Tanganyika 
(now Tanzania), Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and colonial China (Dreze and 
Sen 1989). 
 
There was also discussion around the theoretical ideas of cash vs. food 
aid going back to the 1970s but whilst the principle was recognized it was 
not until the mid-1980s that actual experiments with the practice began 
(Gentilini 2007). These were very much isolated bottom-up pilots, 
pioneered by entrepreneurial agents working in the field and taking 
advantage of local autonomy to explore novel approaches. The 
individuals involved were loosely connected in an informal network and 
so some degree of experience-sharing and accumulation of core models 
for cash-based programming began to emerge. 
The 1990s – further experimentation  
The 1990s involved a limited expansion of experimentation, with a 
number of models being tried in different locations. All shared the idea of 
moving away from direct delivery of food aid and towards using cash as a 
way of empowering local players to procure what they needed. Examples 
included programmes tied to specific objectives like cash for work 
through to more open-ended schemes and different modalities were 
tried, ranging from vouchers and cards to direct cash payments (NORAD 
2011). 
 
These experiments also highlighted challenges in establishing a viable 
cash model. For example, issues of distribution and control, of security 
and of developing an underpinning infrastructure in terms of technology 
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and skills. There was also a need to improve understanding of the ways in 
which local markets operated in order to avoid distorting effects from 
cash interventions. 
 
One other important factor in the 1990s was the growing understanding 
of the context within which food and other assistance was being place 
(Chambers and Conway 1991). In particular the Vulnerability Assessment 
Method and other approaches began to influence the ways in which 
major agencies like WFP and delivery NGOs like Save the Children and 
CARE began to operate(Moret 2014). Tools for assessment of needs 
became sharper and more sophisticated, allowing assistance to be more 
carefully targeted and matched. Part of this development involved 
growing recognition of end-recipients as active agents in the aid process.  
The early 2000s – Maturing of the concept 
By 2001 considerable evidence from ten years of small-scale experiments 
had accumulated demonstrating the solid case for considering cash 
programming as an option in food assistance (Peppiat, Mitchell et al. 
2001). This brought the potential of this radical innovation to the 
attention of senior policy-makers (Harvey 2005) and key networks like 
the Humanitarian Policy Group began to shape the discussion and 
provide a focus for sharing of evidence and experience.  Early advocates 
pressed for more exploration and the agenda was beginning to shift from 
“should we work with cash?” to “how do we work with cash?”.  But 
despite growing interest and activity – particularly amongst early 
adopters like Oxfam, British Red Cross, DFID, Adeso or the Swiss 
Development Corporation –  the overall level of activity was still low. 
 
For example a report for ODI in 2005 commented that “cash and voucher 
approaches remain largely underutilised in the humanitarian sector. A 
review of all of the 2004 United Nations consolidated appeals, …. reveals 
almost no use of cash or vouchers.” (13).   
 
During this period considerable learning took place about the challenges 
of designing and implementing viable cash systems. The need for new 
skills and knowledge, the potential of new technologies and the 
opportunities opened up by a change in the underlying dominant logic of 
food assistance were increasingly recognized and explored. And the 
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concept moved from a ‘one size fits all’ model to an increasingly 
configurable one, shaped to meet different operating contingencies. 
2004 – the ‘tipping point’ 
The huge scale of the 2004 Tsunami crisis prompted a massive response 
and a significant injection of resources into the humanitarian aid system. 
Combined with negligible damage to food production and marketing 
systems beyond the immediate coastal areas this sparked widespread 
experimentation with and evaluation of cash and vouchers as alternatives 
to in-kind food deliveries.  
 
Major cash-based programmes were implemented in a variety of 
locations, offering opportunities for learning and refining the approach. 
The crisis acted as a prism through which the idea of cash programming 
became diffracted, spreading out in terms of operating models, delivery 
systems, target populations and enabling technologies. Some were 
centralized and linked to large-scale formal programmes like cash for 
work whilst others were bottom-up, configured with considerable input 
from end-users. Some were food-focused; others linked their 
programmes to a wider set of needed resources including shelter. This 
was an important phase in the maturing of the concept since it 
highlighted the importance of a deep understanding of context in 
designing, configuring and implementing effective programmes. 
 
The Tsunami experience accelerated mainstream adoption of the CBP 
approach. A 2005 review by the UK Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
(Harvey 2005) concluded that: 
 
“ … a strong body of evidence is starting to emerge to 
indicate that providing people with cash or vouchers 
works. It is possible to target and distribute cash safely, 
and people spend money sensibly on basic essentials and 
on rebuilding livelihoods. Cash transfers can provide a 
stimulus to local economies, and in some contexts can be 
more cost-effective than commodity-based alternatives….” 
 
The field was maturing with evidence about many different contexts (for 
example cash tools were used in the Hurricane Katrina and German flood 
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contexts (Harvey 2007)) and the emergence of policy tools such as 
checklists to help target where, when and in what form CBP would be 
appropriate.   
 
An important contribution here was the role of CaLP – the Cash Learning 
Partnership.  The origin of this group was an informal experience sharing 
network collating and curating the emerging body of knowledge around 
cash programming. It was formalised in 2005 with Oxfam, Save the 
Children and the British Red Cross as founders and has grown to be a key 
institution in the humanitarian innovation landscape supporting capacity 
building, research and information sharing1. 
 
In parallel with this the range of technological options to enable cash 
programming had expanded, especially with the growing use of mobile 
money across cellular phone networks. The experience of M-PESA in 
Kenya opened a wide range of new complementary possibilities around 
how cash systems could be quickly established and operated (Datta, 
Ejakait et al. 2009). 
2010 - moving to scale 
Further impetus was given to the use of cash in the aftermath of the Haiti 
earthquake in 2010.  This was characterized by a very high level of cash-
based interventions; local food markets began functioning soon after the 
disaster and the government stopped food distribution interventions 
after only three months. However the lack of formal distribution systems 
(such as ATMs and key parts of the physical banking infrastructure) 
meant an upsurge in alternative methods of cash distribution. Some were 
low tech involving human agents or physical collection at bank branches 
but there were limits to the scale and location of these operations, 
especially in rural areas. For this reason cash transfers enabled by mobile 
phone were widely adopted, demonstrating the considerable potential of 
such approaches in rapidly setting up and scaling viable systems 
(MacDonald and Gedeon 2012). 
 
During the past five years the expansion has continued, both in CBP 
projects themselves and in learning around specific aspects of the 
approach – for example about delivery mechanisms (Harvey and Bailey 
                                                 
1 For more details see their website: http://www.cashlearning.org/ 
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2010), gender (Brady 2011), scaling up (Austin and Frize 2011), nutritional 
impact (Bailey and Hedlund 2012) and comparative impacts of food aid 
and cash transfers (Hidrobo, Hoddinott et al. 2012); Hoddinott et al., 
2013 (Hoddinott, Sandstrom et al. 2013), (Schwab 2013),(Gilligan, 
Margolies et al. 2013). The response to the 2011 Somalia famine was 
significant because it effectively broke the scale barrier – it was the first 
time that international aid agencies used cash and vouchers at scale in a 
humanitarian response with an estimated $77 m committed in this form 
by 2012. 
 
Major agencies have made substantial changes in their delivery 
programmes – for example, between 2008 and 2011 WFP increased its 
CBP portfolio by a factor of ten, from 5 projects to 51.  Its 2008-2013 
strategic plan stated the intention to provide 30-40% of its assistance in 
the form of cash and vouchers by 2015. Another signal of the acceptance 
of cash is the Food Assistance Convention. Through this international 
treaty, which entered into force in January 2013, countries commit to 
providing certain amounts of annual food assistance. But unlike its 
predecessor (the Food Aid Convention), food aid is no longer the only 
tool through which countries can achieve their commitments; cash and 
vouchers are considered as contributions. Figure 1 summarizes the key 
features of this brief history. 
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Source: Developed by authors. 
 
Figure 1 Key points in the food aid/relief timeline. 
 
5.  Learning for the HI sector  
Innovation theory provides a number of lenses through which to 
interpret this case and provide insights into the workings of the 
humanitarian innovation ecosystem. For example the 
Abernathy/Utterback model of innovation life cycles highlights the ways 
in which a dominant design becomes embedded in a mature system and 
the role played by entrepreneurs in challenging it, recreating a fluid state 
from which a new dominant design emerges (Abernathy and Utterback 
1975). Another helpful lens is Christensen’s theory of disruptive 
innovation which sees radical innovation emerging at the fringes of the 
mainstream, driven by entrepreneurs experimenting and learning in that 
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space (Christensen 1997). Early problems are solved and the innovation 
develops in maturity until it becomes attractive to mainstream markets – 
at which point it poses a challenge to existing incumbents.   
 
The process is one of fast failure and learning, gradually refining key 
elements of the innovation in the context of application.  Recent models 
of agile innovation build on this, using concepts like rapid prototyping, 
minimum viable product, scrum teams and sprints to define a set of tools 
which enable fast cycles of experimentation and learning (Blank 2013; 
Breuer 2013; Morris, Ma et al. 2014).  
 
In the case of cash programming this was very much the observed 
pattern with small-scale entrepreneurial activity refining and defining a 
new model via a process of controlled experimentation with different 
delivery models, technologies and other elements.  In particular the 
process took place at a time of rapid technological change where new 
developments (such as mobile payments and better online security) 
facilitated the building of a carrier infrastructure for cash programming. 
 
The evidence base grew to a point where original objections were 
overcome – for example about whether end users could be trusted, how 
to avoid corruption, maintain security, etc. We can map this on to a 
classical S-curve and explain many of the features around slow take-up 
and then acceleration in terms of diffusion theory (Rogers 2003).  In 
particular slow take-up and early resistance is not simply a matter of 
mindset although this is a powerful inertial force.  Henderson and Clark’s 
theory of architectural innovation highlights the big challenge to the 
underlying structures and competencies required to implement radically 
new models which requires both learning new ways of working and 
simultaneously letting go of old but no longer relevant approaches 
(Henderson and Clark 1990). Cash programming requires a new 
technological infrastructure with different skills, moving away from a 
supply and distribution model to one resembling more closely a financial 
system.  It also moves from a centralized mode towards a decentralized 
network model, with corresponding shifts in power and influence. 
 
Arguably cash programming represents a paradigm shift in the underlying 
mental models around food; this is reflected in the change of terminology 
from food aid to food assistance.  This has required considerable 
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adaptation on the part of mainstream incumbents and challenged much 
in the way of established structure and practice.  
 
The case highlights the existence of an innovation ecosystem within the 
humanitarian sector and the challenges of managing innovation at this 
level.  There are key players and institutions and connectivity across a 
network which supports what Christensen calls sustaining innovation – 
effectively doing what we do but better. But there are also points where 
experimentation takes place and new, radical options emerge; these tend 
to be at the fringes of the mainstream system and not well integrated, 
often driven by individual entrepreneurs acting in maverick mode. They 
have greater flexibility to experiment, uninhibited by the biases, standard 
operating procedures, bureaucracy, cultures, strategic commitments, and 
other rigidities common in established organizations of all kinds. 
 
Finding ways to couple these two systems – the mainstream do better 
machine with its advantages of scale and the entrepreneurial fringe with 
its capacity for radical new thinking – is a significant challenge for the 
ecosystem in the future. Ambidexterity also places emphasis on the role 
of users in context who can help shape and configure innovations so that 
they are suitable for wider diffusion; the process is essentially one of co-
evolution.  There is also considerable opportunity within the sector for 
more open approaches to innovation, especially in cross-sector learning. 
The significant contribution of financial sector professionals and 
institutions to enabling the radical shift in infrastructure is a good 
example where such collaboration can accelerate change. 
 
 
6. Learning from the HI sector 
 
Our third research question – what can the HI sector offer as new insights 
for mainstream innovation management? – highlights the potential for 
seeing HI as a ‘crisis laboratory’ for stimulating novel thinking.  Innovation 
in this context is often radical in nature because the existing set of 
solutions to problems are closed off.  Research – for example the ALNAP 
study mentioned earlier – shows that the turning point in innovation 
management involves not just a series of windows of opportunity for a 
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new idea or practice, but also serious constraints on existing standard 
operating procedures.  Faced with this roadblock there is often little 
choice but to try a completely new approach.   
 
In particular such crisis – driven innovation is characterized by  
 
• Extreme conditions forcing a radical rethink of solution 
approaches, potentially opening up new innovation trajectories 
 
• Users and context are critical – HI requires user participation in 
configuring solutions  
 
• Rapid prototyping and learning are a key feature, HI is linked to 
entrepreneurial experimentation 
 
• Rapid diffusion- a combination of urgency of need, configuration 
of appropriate solutions by engaged users and resource backing 
form major aid agencies to drive adoption to scale 
 
• Recombination – the failure of existing solutions under crisis 
conditions forces a rethink and wider search space, opening up 
potential for cross-sector learning 
 
Arguably these conditions provide a ‘laboratory’ for exploring alternative 
approaches and generating novel innovation trajectories which might 
diffuse more widely – the concept of ‘reverse innovation’ 
(Govindarajan, Trimble et al. 2012).   
As a source of radical innovation, a way of breaking with dominant 
designs and established trajectories, HI represents an important 
approach which may have wider potential.  (Significantly some 
organizations report making use of ‘constructed crises’ as an aid to 
moving into new mindsets and generating space for radical innovation 
paper (Kim 1998)). 
 
 
So how might a process of systematic learning from crisis innovation 
operate? Table 1 sets out an outline process model involving several 
linked stages. Crisis conditions set stretch targets and force search 
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behaviour in new directions; they also cue attentional responses to new 
signals rather than filtering them out. In the HI cases the ability to find a 
passionate entrepreneur at the centre may not be coincidence – their 
role is to have the vision but also the passion to infect others and bring 
them into the vision.  
 
Exploration of potential new directions involves an ‘observatory’ stage, in 
which search behaviour is enabled in novel ways.  This corresponds to 
open innovation search patterns and may well require brokerage, cross-
sector linkages, working with users, foresight, ethnography and multiple 
other approaches and often involves deliberate recruitment of outsiders 
to bring alternative experience and perspectives.  It also requires the 
ability to abstract the core problem to a higher level such that potential 
solutions in other sectors/worlds can be perceived as relevant.  
 
The ‘laboratory’ stage involves experimentation with the original idea to 
adapt it to the new context. By its nature this process involves failure and 
fast learning and user input is critical in shaping and configuring a robust 
solution. Whilst the initial idea may be radical its shaping and 
development involves integrating a wide range of small scale incremental 
improvements in a process of experimentation, learning, capture and 
codification.  
 
In the ‘prototype’ stage there is further need for high user engagement 
and development of robust configurations which will actually work and 
be accepted. At this stage it is important to have a working model of the 
system level innovation which can act as a boundary object 
demonstrating the operation and advantages of the new approach but 
also allowing input from potential adopters in further shaping and 
developing the ideas.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Suggested process model for working with crisis-driven 
innovation. 
Stage Characteristic activity 
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Crisis  Creation of a driving entrepreneurial 
vision which simultaneously articulates 
the need for change and for radically 
different solution involving anew 
trajectory 
Observatory Extensive search in novel directions to 
find relevant approaches which could be 
adapted – requires ability to abstract 
problem and solution thinking to a 
higher level and brokerage mechanisms 
to make connections 
Laboratory  Experimentation around core ideas and 
creating in context a new system 
through recombination of proven 
elements from elsewhere 
Prototyping  Development of a scale version of the 
system which allows for testing and 
configuration in context with users. Also 
provides a boundary object which can 
demonstrate potential and engage key 
agents in further development and 
diffusion 
Scaling and diffusion Codification of core model into a 
standard transferable package which can 
be replicated. Importantly this allows for 
further innovation and continuous 
improvement via channels which 
integrate emerging ideas into the 
standard operating model 
 
Source: Developed by authors. 
 
Finally widespread diffusion depends on the codification of the new 
system into a transferable model.  This does not mean that further 
innovation will not take place; indeed it is characteristic of the examples 
given that continuous improvement is embedded in their design. But the 
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basic model has become standardized and codified to the point that it 
can be handed on to others who have not had direct experience and 
sufficient detail of the standard operating mode available to enable them 
to set up and operate in a different context.  This part of the process is 
assisted by the fact that users and players have been involved in co-
creating and especially configuring the model. 
 
Mobilising this kind of approach poses challenges for established 
organizations but might usefully form part of the remit and operating 
model for corporate venturing units looking to facilitate ‘out of the box’ 
thinking on behalf of their organizations.  Examples include Vodafone’s 
involvement in the evolution of mobile payments in the M-PESA system 
in Kenya, Novo-Nordisks’s exploration of the challenges in evolving a 
diabetes care service programme in Tanzania, UPS’s work on ‘extreme 
logistics’ in post-disaster situations and the MasterCard/World Food 
Programme alliance described earlier. 
 
But it also raises questions about ‘ambidexterity’ of the kind discussed 
earlier since the kind of project originating in such a ‘crisis laboratory’ 
may well challenge existing trajectories and their supporting structures; 
we saw an example of this in the food aid case.  Successful integration of 
insights generated by it will depend on effective bridging mechanisms to 
ensure novel ideas are communicated, absorbed and deployed.  In this 
respect the challenge is one of developing ‘absorptive capacity’ – building 
routines which allow not only for external search but also selection (by-
passing the ‘corporate immune system’ (Bessant, Von Stamm et al. 
2011)), assimilation and exploitation (Zahra and George 2002.).  Further 
exploration on this boundary crossing challenge in open innovation will 
be an important future research priority (Newey 2010; Heil and Enkel 
2015). 
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